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Abstract
This paper reviews international experiences with the implementation of wage subsidies
and develops a policy framework to guide their design in developing countries. The
evidence suggests that, if the goal is only to create jobs, wage subsidies are unlikely to
be an effective instrument. Wage subsidies, however, could have a role in helping
first-time job seekers or those who have gone through long-periods of unemployment
or inactivity, to gain some work experience and in the process build skills and improve
their employability. If these ?learning? effects are large enough, the social benefits of
wage subsidies could outweigh their cost. When wage subsidies are designed with
these objectives in mind, there are important implications in terms of eligibility and
targeting, how the subsidy is set, its duration, and the types of conditionalities on
employers and beneficiaries. Given uncertainty regarding their impact, in all cases,
programs should be piloted and evaluated prior to full scale implementation.
JELs: J2, J3, J6
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1 Introduction
Wage subsidies, payments to employers or workers that reduce the cost of labor or
increase take-home pay, are increasingly being adopted or considered by developing
countries as one component of their labor market policy (ILO and World Bank 2012).
Wage subsidies were common during the recent financial crisis as a means to maintain
employment levels (Banerji et al. 2014). In several countries they are used to promote
the integration into the labor market of specific groups of workers, including youth and
women (Almeida et al. 2012). When present, wage subsidies can account for over 20 percent
of spending on active labor market programs, similar to OECD countries (OECD 2003).
Most of the evaluations of wage subsidy programs focus on high income countries and
have shown a large variation in results. Neumark (2013) recently summarized the litera-
ture concluding that, in general, targeted hiring credits have likely been ineffective (see
also Bartik 2001; Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Katz 1998)1.
The consensus seems to be that wage subsidies can increase employment levels, but also
induce considerable substitution and windfall effects. The few evaluations in developing
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countries corroborate the effects on employment but do not look at substitution and
windfall effects. At the same time, there is some evidence showing that by facilitating
access to jobs, wage subsidies can have a long term effect on individuals? human capital
and employability (see Heckman et al. 2002). The social benefits of this increase in human
capital could, in principle, outweigh the cost of the subsidies.
In this paper we review international experiences with the implementation of wage sub-
sidies and outline a policy framework to guide their design in developing countries. We
argue that the main rationale for wage subsidies in these countries would be giving job
opportunities to workers who would otherwise remain unemployed or take jobs that do
not exploit their potential productivity. These are workers whose expected productivity
is too low relative to the ?market? wage associated with a given vacancy. This is the wage
that employers are willing to pay and the average worker who qualifies for the vacancy is
willing to accept, given labor and social insurance regulations. The expected productiv-
ity of some job-seekers, for instance youth, can be below this wage because of the lack
of work experience or because they are not able to signal to the employer that they have
the necessary skills (e.g., they do not have diplomas that certify their skills or the diplo-
mas they have are not trustworthy). In the absence of wage subsidies these workers are
likely to face long spells of inactivity or unemployment that reduce their human capital,
or take on jobs that will not realize their potential productivity. Wage subsidies, in this
case, have the potential to increase workers? employability through ?learning by doing?
and by training opportunities associated with having a job. Workers could acquire both
?hard? (occupational) skills and ?soft? skills, such as motivation and appropriate work-
place behavior. These dynamic effects could make a temporary subsidy have a permanent
effect on workers? productivity and through this channel the structure of employment and
the unemployment rate.
The paper starts by developing a simple model that captures some of these ideas and
suggests some general principles in terms of design. The two sections that follow review
some of the empirical evidence on the impact of wage subsidies on labor markets, and
develop a typology of design and implementation options based on lessons from interna-
tional experiences. We then use this typology to make some proposals about how to setup
(or reform) wage subsidy programs in developing countries. The last section summarizes
the main issues and conclusions.
2 Wage subsidies as an instrument to improve human capital and labor
markets opportunities
We refer to wage subsidies as any transfer from the government that is able to reduce
the cost of labor and/or increase take-home pay. Hence, there are many types of wages
subsidies depending on who the payee is (employers or workers); how the transfer is
made (social security contributions, taxes, or direct transfers); or eligibility and targeting
criteria (all workers, new entrants, youth). There are, of course, also differences in the
administrative arrangements used to implement wage subsidies (see Section 3). Regard-
less, wage subsidies can affect the cost of labor and take home pay and therefore the supply
and demand of labor.
In the classic static model of the labor market wage subsidies, whether paid to the
employer or the employee, have the same effect on employment and wages. These effects
depend on the elasticity of demand and supply. In general, take home pay increases by
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less than the amount of the subsidy and the rest is captured by the employer. In the
extreme case where the demand for labor is infinitely inelastic there are no changes in
take home pay or employment, and all the subsidy is captured by employers. But if wages
are rigid downward, who receives the subsidy matters. If wage subsidies are paid to work-
ers labor supply will increase and labor demand might not increase enough thus creating
unemployment.
An important limitation of the static model is that it implies that effects on employ-
ment and wages persist only as long as the subsidy is paid. Many wage subsidies are
paid only for a fixed period (often one or two years) after a worker is hired. If this is the
case, time-limited wage subsidies do little to change persistently the employment rates
of beneficiaries. At the same time, making the subsidy long-term or permanent can be
unaffordable. In addition, there can be losses, because part of the subsidies go to work-
ers who would have been hired anyways (the ?windfall? effect). And, when not all workers
have access to the wage subsidy, there can be substitution effects (subsidized workers
replace non-subsidized workers) that further reduce employment effects. For these rea-
sons, under the optics of the static model, wage subsidies are often dismissed as an
ineffective or inefficient policy tool for reducing unemployment.
However, if workers are able to learn and acquire skills from the work they do (?learn-
ing by doing?) the balance of social costs and benefits can be different2. In this case, by
contributing to build human capital, a job can have a value that goes beyond the employer
and the individual (see World Bank 2013). Similarly, if the skills of unemployed individ-
uals depreciate over time, long unemployment spells can reduce human capital. In this
case, the main objective of wage subsidies would not be to create short-term jobs, but
to increase individuals? human capital and employability and therefore their future labor
market opportunities.
Wage subsidies could be considered when, in their absence, certain individuals, par-
ticularly those with no or little work experience, might not be able to access jobs that
can use and expand their skills3. Employers might prefer to hire experienced workers
or,alternatively, offer wages that become too low relative to the prospective candidates?
reservation wages. Workers therefore would remain unemployed or take on lower pro-
ductivity jobs that pay more but for which they are overqualified and where they have few
learning opportunities. This would not only reduce the accumulation of human capital
over time but also affect employment levels and the structure of employment.
To fix these ideas we present a simple model where employers and workers make deci-
sions about whether to offer/accept a job at a given wage. The model does not aim to
describe equilibrium in the labor market or derive welfare implications of wage subsidies.
It simply illustrates how learning on the job could justify the use of wage subsidies. In the
model, workers differ in their initial level of human capital yi and work experience, and
employers in the maximum level of productivity qj of the jobs they offer. This is the pro-
ductivity generated by workers who have learned the ?trade of the business?. At that time,





1+i t yi (1)
where t is the time spent in job j and i captures the learning ability of the individual.
This formulation implies that the level of human capital of two identical individuals (i.e.,
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they have the same yi and i) can diverge over time depending on the jobs they have.
Individuals in more productive, and supposedly more demanding, jobs learn more.
The ratio aij = qi/yi can be interpreted as individuals? learning potential in a given job,
or the inverse of their ?readiness? for the job. It captures the set of technical, cognitive, and
non-cognitive skills that individuals possess relative to those needed by the job (seeWorld
Bank 2013). We notice that, in principle, there is always a job j for which the individual
can operate, from the start, with maximum productivity and where, therefore, there is no
learning (aij = 1).
When an employer and a worker are matched, they agree on a wage wi that splits gross
profits, or total output net of non-labor costs. In a dynamic setting, the present value of







ij − wi − αjqj
(1 + r)t (2)
where L is the planning horizon of the employer, and αj is a parameter defining the fixed
costs of the job4. These fix costs are assumed to increase with the productivity of the job.
The profits equation can be simplified to:





where Hij = H(aij, r, i, L) gives the present value of future learning for individual i in job
j, and G = G(r, L) is the annuity factor used to discount wages and other costs at a rate r.
From the last expression it is clear that, for a given job, there is a minimum level of
initial human capital and learning abilities that the employee needs to have in order to
generate positive profits with positive wages. If yi and i are too low, even the high learning
potential aij will not compensate. For instance, if i = 0 and yi < αjqj there cannot be
positive profits. Using wage subsidies to force contracts and create jobs in this case would
not make economic sense.
But there are also cases where individuals with adequate levels of human capital and
learning abilities, workers who have the right basic skills or diplomas, can be exclude
from jobs of type j if they do not have work experience (or if they cannot signal that they
have the right skills). This is because employers, at a given market wage, might prefer
to hire workers who can start operating at maximum productivity right away. Clearly,
inexperienced individuals such as youth graduating from university could compensate for
their learning needs (or the need to prove themselves) by accepting a wage cut relative to
the experienced worker. Unfortunately, as discussed below, these wage cuts might not be
always viable.
For employers to be indifferent between hiring an inexperienced worker i and a experi-











where the second part of the expression is the maximum profit that an employer can





and receives the maximum wage wj.
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> qj − yi HijG (5)
It can be shown, however, that the wage cut might not be accepted if the reservation
wage of the individual is affected, at least in part, by the availability of lower productivity
jobs that would pay more ? even if they imply less or no learning. To see this, assume that




is mediated by the parameter βj (a measure of the










βj + Aij − aijaij
)
qj (6)
where Aij = Hij/G
The worker will take the wage cut if the job k that matches its productivity (qk = yi)
pays a lower wage. Like in the case of a higher productivity job that wage is given by:
wik = (1 − αk) βkyi
The condition for taking the higher productivity job therefore is:((
1 − αj
)
βj + Aij − aijaij
)
yiaij > (1 − αk) βkyi (7)





+ (Aij − aij) > (1 − αk) βkaij (8)
This condition holds if the parameters defining costs structures and bargaining power
for the two jobs are the same
(
αj = αk and βj = βk
)
and if Aij > aij. But this is not always
the case. Depending on the expected level of learning and the difference between the job?s
maximum productivity and the individual?s human capital,Aij can be lower than aij. To
the extreme, if no learning is possible, Aij = 1, the inequality would not hold (in this case
a wage subsidy would not be effective either). In addition, in a more general situation, the
parameters defining costs structures and bargaining power are unlikely to be the same.
For instance, it is reasonable to think that in lower productivity jobs fixed costs would be




βj < (1 − αk) βk .
In these cases, a wage subsidy could be set so that equation (8) holds. Under the assump-
tion that costs structures and bargaining power are the same between jobs, the wage






Thus the wage subsidy would be a function of the individual?s human capital and the
difference between the ?learning potential? of the job minus the ?effective learning? in a
given period of time. Clearly, not all jobs j would qualify. In some cases, aij −Aij might be
too high and the subsidy too expensive, either because the maximum productivity of the
job is too high relative to the individual?s human capital, or because learning abilities for
the job are too low.
A corollary is that a wage subsidy would not be set in absolute terms, but in relation to
individual?s human capital and their learning potential ? the latter dependent on the job
andmost likely unknown to policymakers. A wage subsidy that does not take into account
initial levels of human capital might be too small for some. A wage subsidy that only takes
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into account human capital might exclude jobs with high learning potential. One way to
proceed would be to set the wage subsidy as a fraction s of ?negotiated? wages5.
This wage would be, presumably, close to the reservation wage of individuals and thus
reflect their human capital. The fraction s would then implicitly define the set of jobs j
that are ?feasible? for a given individual, meaning jobs where the subsidy would be enough







In summary, at any level of human capital, workers might not find jobs that suit their
skills/diplomas because of the lack of work experience and/or difficulties signaling these
skills (long-term unemployment can also bring observed skills below their potential6).
Their reservation wages are likely to be higher than the wage offers they receive to com-
pensate for their learning needs. In part, this is because lower productivity jobs could pay
more. But other factors (not taken into account in our simple model) such as family sup-
port or expectations about fair wages for a given set of skills can also increase reservation
wages. Workers would then prefer to wait and remain unemployed seeking for better job
offers, or eventually settle in lower productivity jobs where there would be less learning7.
Clearly, one can argue that rational individuals would understand that they are better off
over the long term by taking the higher productivity jobs and accepting the lower wages.
They could, for instance, borrow to help support the period of on the job training at low
pay and then repay the loan when their salaries increase. But even if individuals had the
right foresight, access to credit is often not an option, particularly, among worker with no
job history or who have been through long periods of unemployment.
Under these circumstance wage subsidies could be considered as an instrument to facil-
itate access to jobs and promote learning and improve individuals? employability. The
social benefits they generate would not be linked to the short-term jobs they create, but
the human capital that would accumulate as a result of these jobs.
The implication is that countries considering the adoption of wage subsidies should
clearly define the objectives and expectations. Without learning effects, wage subsi-
dies are unlikely to be effective. If, on the contrary, the goal is to give individuals work
experience and promote learning, their design and implementation should be adapted
accordingly. Our analysis suggests three important elements that need to be considered: a)
targeting wage subsidies to workers who need and can benefit from the work experience
and learning (which implies that the identification should be with the program sponsor
and not employers); b) setting the wage subsidy in proportion to negotiated wages ? not
in absolute value or as a negative income tax; and c) give the subsidy to individuals, not
particular sets of employers, who then are allowed to seek the jobs that better match their
skills.
3 Evidence of the impact of wage subsidies on labor markets
The purposes of this section is not provide a comprehensive review of the economics lit-
erature on wage subsidies, but to discuss some of the main results that have emerged8.
These focus on the employment, substitution and windfall effects of the programs. Much
less is known about the effect of wage subsidies on human capital, or other issues
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such as their impact on product markets through displacement effects9 or the informal
economy10.
Economists have typically resorted to two methods to determine the effects of employ-
ment subsidies on employment and earnings. First, they have used inferences based on
estimates of the elasticity of labor demand to estimate the effects of a given change in
the labor costs on the expected change in employment. Second, and an arguably bet-
ter approach to measuring results, they have used experimental or quasi-experimental
methods.
Some of the main results come from the U.S. and provide mixed evidence about the
effectiveness of wage subsidies as tools to foster job creation. The U.S. has enacted four
wage subsidy programs: the New Jobs Tax Credit of the 1970s, the Work Opportuni-
ties Tax Credit (formerly Targeted Jobs Tax Credit), the Earned Income Tax Credit, and
on-the-job training under the Job Training Partnership Act. As summarized in Neumark
(2013), some of the studies evaluating these programs suggest that hiring credits are inef-
fective (Hamersma 2008; Bartik 2001; Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Katz 1998).
This seems to be the case at least for programs that target the disadvantaged. There is
much less evidence regarding more-broadly targeted or non-categorical hiring credits
that explicitly try to boost job creation in the aggregate. Recently, Neumark and Grijalva
(2013) explore an extensive set of state hiring credits and find that these broader programs
were effective in promoting employment creation during the Great Recession.
Two studies attempted to estimate the effect of New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) on overall
employment. Bishop (1981) found that the NJTC increased employment in construction
and retail by 150,000 to 670,000, or about .2 - .8 percent11.
Katz (1998) estimates that the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) increased the employ-
ment of disadvantaged 23?24 year olds by 3.4 percentage points, or 7.7 percent in the
late 1980s. This estimate suggests that 40 to 52 percent of the jobs getting TJTC sub-
sidies reflected net employment additions for economically disadvantaged 23?24 year
olds at a cost of USD 1,500 (1991 dollars)per net job created. Katz (1998) concluded that
temporary, non-categorical, incremental subsidies have some potential for stimulating
employment growth. However, using different methods, Bishop and Montgomery (1993)
estimated that only about 25 percent of the subsidized jobs under TJTC represented net
new job creation for young workers, with the remaining 75 percent representing windfalls
to youth who would have been hired in the absence of the subsidy. Thus, Bishop estimated
a much higher cost per net new job created, in the range of USD 5,000 to USD 11,500. He
did find that young workers did not displace older workers. More recently, researchers
have taken a stronger position on the limited effectiveness of the NJTC (Bartik and Bishop
2009; Bishop 2008; Bartik 2001).
The evidence showed that the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), aside from
achieving its distributional goals, was more effective at increasing employment among
affected groups and overall (Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin 2000). The U.S. Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides a refundable income tax credit to workers with earn-
ings below a certain threshold. In what is probably the best evaluation of that program
to date, Hotz et al. (2006) examined the impact of a substantial liberalization of the EITC
during the period 1991?2000 for welfare recipients with two or more children. They
found that the 3.4 percent increase in disposable income attributable to the EITC led to a
5.6 percent increase in employment in this group.
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The final U.S. wage subsidy, the on-the-job training subsidy under the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) has been evaluated by many authors (see Heckman et al. 1997;
Bloom et al. 1997; andOrr et al. 1996). Orr et al. (1996) found that an employment strategy
built around a 6-month subsidy of half the worker?s wage did not significantly increase
the earnings of youth or adult men, but raised women?s earnings by about 15 percent over
a 30-month period12. The effect was especially pronounced for women receiving welfare,
whose earnings were nearly 50 percent higher than they would have been in the absence
of the program. The study also found that a six-month on-the-job training subsidy under
the U.S. Job Training Partnership Act increased the earnings of adult men by 6?10 percent
and adult women by about 16 percent in the two-year period after the subsidy ended.
These evaluations all focused on the effects of wage subsidies on employment (and, in
the case of JTPA, earnings). This focus may miss an important effect of such programs on
wages. As Katz (1998) notes, if the elasticity of supply of labor is .4 and the demand elastic-
ity is -.5, in the comparative static model described earlier in this paper a 10 percent wage
subsidy will lead to a 2 percent increase in employment, but a 5.6 percent increase in wage
rates. Chetty et al. (2011) suggests that the appropriate elasticity of supply for assessing
responses to temporary tax changes (which includes most wage subsidies) is about .75.
This value, together with a demand elasticity of -.5, would imply that a 10 percent wage
subsidy would lead to a 3 percent increase in employment and a 4 percent increase in
wage rates. While there is considerable uncertainty about the values of these elasticities,
even in the U.S. and especially for narrowly defined groups of workers, these calculations
suggest that greater attention should be paid to the potential effects of wage subsidies on
wage rates.
A number of other wage subsidy evaluations, of varying quality, have been conducted in
developed countries other than the U.S. TheWorking Tax Credit (WTC) is a UK program
that is similar in structure to the U.S. EITC13. Blundell (2006) evaluated an earlier ver-
sion of WTC called the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), which was in effect from
1999?2003, for lone parents only (the counterparts of the U.S. welfare population). He
found that over the period 1999?2003, theWFTC increased lone parents? labor supply by
3.5 ? 4.0 percentage points, or about the same as Hotz et al. (2006) found for the U.S.
EITC. Although the WFTC was substantially more generous than the EITC, Blundell
argues that its incentive effects were reduced by its interactions with other subsidies, such
as the UK housing allowance, which substantially increased the already high marginal tax
rate under the WFTC.
In 1998, the UK also enacted a targeted wage subsidy for youth, similar to the JTPA
on-the-job training program in the U.S. Under the New Deal for Young People (NDYP),
workers age 18 to 24 who had been claiming Job Seeker?s Allowance (unemployment com-
pensation) for six months or more are entitled to a voucher for a subsidy to prospective
employers of 60 pounds per week for up to six months. At 18?20 months after program
entry, Dorsett (2006) found that the wage subsidy reduced unemployment among youth
by as much as 20 percentage points, relative to the other options available to them under
the NDYP (subsidized education and training or short-term employment in the voluntary
sector or with an environment-focused organization).
There have been several evaluations of the French system, in which payroll taxes are
reduced for low-wage workers; the subsidy is phased out as wages rise. Using house-
hold data, Kramarz and Philippon (2001) compared workers affected by changes in the
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minimum wage or the payroll tax subsidy when those policies changed with workers
just above that level. They found that increases in the minimum wage reduced employ-
ment, but found no evidence of increased employment when the payroll tax subsidy was
increased. Crepon and Desplatz (2002) used firm data to estimate the effects of different
levels of the payroll tax on total employment at the firm level. They found that larger sub-
sidies were indeed correlated with faster growth in total employment (in cross-section),
but their data did not allow them to distinguish between growth in low-wage jobs and
growth in high-wage jobs.
Goos and Konings (2007) also used firm data to evaluate the payroll subsidies for man-
ual workers in Belgium, and found significant effects on employment. A careful analysis
of the Finnish payroll subsidy for older, low-wage workers by Huttunen et al. (2010) found
mixed results: the subsidy had no significant effect on employment or the probability of
leaving a job, but produced a 2 percent increase in the hours of work for employees in
the industrial sector (but not the service sector) by increasing the probability that a part-
time worker would become full-time by 7 percent. At the same time, the subsidy reduced
hourly earnings of industrial workers by 2 percent, just offsetting the effect of the increase
in hours on earnings.
Several authors have studied the effects of wage subsidies in Sweden. Sianesi (2004),
Carling and Richardson (2004), Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), and Forslund et al.
(2004) evaluated variants of a program that provided employer subsidies of up to 50 per-
cent of earnings for firms that hired the long-term (more than 6 months) unemployed.
All found that the subsidies reduced unemployment among this group.
A few studies also emphasize design issues. There is some evidence, for instance, sug-
gesting that limiting the duration of the subsidy may be an effective way to increase
program success. Limited period hiring subsidies have, for example, had positive impacts
on workers? employability in Sweden (Sianesi 2004) and Germany (Jirjahn et al. 2009, and
Bernhard et al. 2008). In their review, Martin and Grubb (2001) find hiring subsidies to
be more effective than public training measures or public works; however, the impact of
programs varies depending on the design.
Most of these studies do not distinguish between the employment effects while the
wage subsidy is being received, as predicted by the static model, and the longer-term
employment effects generated by greater work experience and, therefore, higher produc-
tivity, as predicted by the dynamic model discussed in the previous section. However,
the studies cited earlier, by Orr et al. (1996), Bell et al. (1999), strongly imply that the
employment effects of wage subsidies persist long after the subsidy expires. In another
study Heckman et al. (2002) posit a model of ?learning by doing? in which time spent
working increases human capital and contrast it with a model of ?on-the-job training?,
which entails a tradeoff between working and training and, therefore, forgone earn-
ings. Using changes in earnings induced by changes in the structure of the U.S. Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC), they show that under a model of learning by doing, the EITC
increases workers? lifetime earnings, whereas under the formal training model, the EITC
actually reduces earnings, once the tradeoff between work and training is taken into
account14.
While the empirical results of Heckman et al. (2002) depend crucially on the specific
form of the EITC, the general idea that working increases human capital is consistent with
a number of studies that have shown a positive effect of work experience on earnings. For
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example, using data for youth in the U.K., Bell et al. (1999) estimate that, while there is
no statistically significant effect of work experience on earnings in the first 9 months of
work, 10?12 months of work experience increases the hourly wage by nearly 10 percent.
As Bell et al. (1999) note, some analysts argue that wage subsidies to the long-term
unemployed may also have beneficial general equilibrium effects. The argument is essen-
tially that the long term unemployed are ?outsiders? in the labor market. They exert little
downward pressure on nominal wages (which in these models is a function of unemploy-
ment). By transforming ?outsiders? into ?insiders? the equilibrium rate of unemployment is
lowered because effective labor supply is higher.
Even though the evidence in developing countries is still thin, it suggests that the suc-
cess of wage subsidies depends on context. For example, in Slovakia, wage subsidies do
not appear to have increase employment or earnings among beneficiaries (Lubyova and
Ours 1999). In Poland the results were even less encouraging: male beneficiaries of wage
subsidies were less likely to be employed. This is likely to be explained by a stigma effect
where beneficiaries are perceived by the employers as inferior workers than otherwise
identical workers (Kluve et al. 1999).
However, wage subsidies seem to have worked better among welfare beneficiaries in
Argentina. Indeed, in the Proempleo experiment discussed in the next section, receipt
of a wage subsidy voucher ? with or without training ? significantly increased wage
employment in the first 18 months after random assignment by 8?9 percentage points
and reduced reliance on workfare by a similar amount for women and youth (younger
than 30). In spite of this, most employers did not take up the wage subsidy even though
they ended up hiring the workers who had a voucher15.
Wage subsidies also seem to be effective tools for increasing the employment of skilled
youth in contexts of high taxation of formal labor. For example, in Morocco, early evi-
dence shows that the program Idmaj was effective in placing beneficiaries into jobs.
Furthermore, the program also had positive effects on the quality of jobs, assessed by hav-
ing social security coverage and by the level of earnings (see World Bank 2012). However,
while wage subsidies seemed to be cost-effective in Morocco and Argentina, the costs are
likely to be underestimated.
In Turkey, Betcherman et al. (2010) looked at the effects of two employment subsidy
schemes and showed that these led to significant net increases in registered jobs in eligible
provinces (5?13 percent for the first program and 11?15 percent for the second) but that
there were substantial windfalls. An important effect was, however, the increased social
security registration of firms and workers rather than boosting total employment and
economic activity. In general, studies suggest that a 10 percentage point reduction in the
tax-wedge (the difference between the cost of labor and take home pay) could increase
employment between 1 and 5 percentage points (see Nickell 2003; Kugler and Kugler
2009; and (Rutowski: ?Labor Taxes and Employment in ECA.?, Unpublished).
More recent evaluations for Jordan and South Africa also showmixed results. In Jordan,
a pilot program gave beneficiaries a voucher equivalent to the minimum wage with a
duration of six months. The evaluation showed that this voucher increased employment
by 40 percentage points over the short-term, although most of the jobs were informal.
Four months after the voucher expired, however, the effects dissipated ? except outside
the capital (see Groh et al. 2012). This seems to be explained, in part, by labor regulations
that force firms to issue open ended contracts after a certain period of time.
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Yet, in South Africa, the impact of the wage subsidy persisted even one and two
years after the allocation (see Levinsonhn et al. 2013). The impact was relatively
large: those in the treatment group where 7.4 percentage points more likely to be in
wage employment. This suggests that the subsidy had important dynamics impacts on
youth.
This overview does not purport to be an exhaustive catalog of wage subsidy evaluations.
It nonetheless illustrates several important points. First, such policies are likely to have
relatively modest impacts on employment on the order of 5 percentage points or less.
This is certainly a positive contribution for groups with high unemployment, but it seems
clear that wage subsidies will not, by themselves, solve the problem. Second, both theory
and the empirical results suggest that substitution and windfall effect can be important
and therefore should receive more attention in evaluations. Third, wage subsidies can,
potentially, facilitate learning and improve beneficiaries? labormarket opportunities. And,
finally, the wide variation in design and target groups of the subsidies tested, together
with the likely idiosyncratic, country-specific economic contexts within which they were
implemented, means that one cannot confidently extrapolate these results to a new pro-
gram in a different country. To be confident of the effects of any new wage subsidy, it
should be pilot tested and carefully evaluated in the context within which it is intended to
operate.
4 Review of design and implementation arrangements
Design of a wage subsidy program involves decisions with respect to a number of policy
parameters. Different combinations of parameters yield markedly different programs. In
this section we examine those policy choices and the different incentives they imply.
4.1 The payee
An important choice to be made is whether the wage subsidy is to be paid to the employer
or the worker. As noted above, if labor markets are perfectly competitive and wages are
flexible downward, the employment and wage rate effects should be invariant with the
choice of payee. But these are strong conditions that likely do not hold in developing
countries. If wages are in fact inflexible downward for social or institutional reasons, a
wage subsidy paid to workers is more likely to create unemployment than add employ-
ment. In such circumstances, the value of a subsidy paid to workers would be almost
entirely captured by the existing workforce. The choice of payee depends, then, on factors
like the elasticities of supply and demand and, especially, the flexibility of wages that may
vary across countries. It seems likely that in developing countries with a large informal
sector the elasticity of the supply of low-skilled labor to the formal sector is quite high,
simply because any significant increase in compensation (including subsidies) in the for-
mal sector can draw large numbers of workers out of the informal sector. If wage rates
in the formal sector are flexible downward, this will lead to large employment effects in
that sector whether the subsidy is paid to workers or employers. If wages are inflexible
downward, payments to employers will lead to employment gains, whereas payments to
workers will result in unemployment and a large deadweight loss in the form of a windfall
to incumbent workers.
In developing countries, wage subsidies are almost always paid to the firm, in part for
administrative reasons (see the discussion below), although in a few cases ? e.g., the Youth
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Employment Subsidy in Chile ? the subsidy is split between employer and worker (see
Table 1).
4.2 Targeting
Eligibility for the subsidy can range from broadly inclusive to narrowly restrictive. In some
countries, wage subsidies cover all low-wage or low-income workers. Frequently, how-
ever, the target population is limited to newly-hired unemployed workers in certain age
groups ? for example, Turkey, South Africa, Colombia, and Chile all subsidize newly-
hired youth, and Colombia and Chile subsidize workers over the age of 40 or 50. The
eligibility age for youth varies from less than 26 to less than 36. Subsidies for unemployed
workers are sometimes targeted on the long-term unemployed (usually defined as out of
work for 12?18 months). Wage subsidies can also be targeted to certain regions of the
country (as in Turkey) or industries, in an effort to stimulate employment in the targeted
sectors.
While narrow targeting of the subsidy almost certainly reduces the budgetary cost of
the program and maximizes the benefits to the favored group, those benefits are likely to
come at the expense of other groups. The wage differential between the targeted group
and other workers with similar skills gives employers an incentive to substitute the former
for the latter ? an incentive that will almost certainly affect hiring decisions and that may
be strong enough to induce employers to lay off unsubsidized workers in order to hire
subsidized workers. If all workers at a given skill level are subsidized, substitution is more
difficult because it would change the skill mix of the employer?s workforce.
Of course, substitution is not always undesirable. If the policy objective is to help first-
time job seekers or the long-term unemployed, subsidies to these groups are intended
to induce employers to hire them instead of the more experienced or more recently
employed workers they would normally hire. One simply must be cognizant of the
Table 1 Policy parameters ? illustrative choices in selected countries
Policy parameter Countries
Payee Turkey ? newly employed workers in low-income provinces;
Chile and Columbia ? firm
Targeting Colombia ? youth (younger than 28),
long-term unemployed women (older than 40)
internally displaced, disabled, or
socially reintegrated individuals;
Belgium ? long-term unemployed and low-wage workers
Duration Chile ? youth until age 25; other workers: 5?6 months;
Turkey ? women, youth, and workers in low-income provinces 5 years
Level South Africa ? 50pc of wage up to R833 per month;
Austria ? Age 50?55: 50pc of social security tax;
older than 55: 100pc of social security tax
Payment vehicle Turkey ? exemption from tax and social security contributions
Jordan - direct payment to employer
U.S. reduction in income taxes
Conditionalities employers Colombia - less than 50 employees and assets less than
5000 time minimum wage
Conditionalities workers Lebanon and Tunisia participation in life skills training
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incentives created by the subsidy and be sure that they are consistent with the policy
objective.
4.3 Duration
Wage subsidies are either paid indefinitely, so long as the worker remains eligible, or are
time-limited. Time-limited subsidies are usually targeted on newly hired workers who
were previously unemployed (sometimes within a demographic or geographic class). For
example, Colombia subsidizes firms that hire women over the age of 40 who have been
unemployed at least 12 months. Common durations for time-limited subsidies are six
months to two years. There are several different rationales for time-limited subsidies. In
some cases, they are used as a countercyclical measure to combat a rise in unemployment.
The ?learning-by-doing? theory also justifies temporary subsidies after which workers are
expected to have acquired sufficient skills to make them productive enough for finding
employment on an unsubsidized basis. If this is the case, time-limiting the subsidy is one
way to achieve the employment effects of wage subsidies while greatly reducing windfall
effects. As noted above, however, if the learning-by-doing hypothesis does not hold true,
or if the duration of the subsidy is not sufficient to significantly enhance the worker?s
skills, time-limited subsidies create only a temporary employment effect and, at the same
time, create a perverse incentive for ?churning? ? letting workers go when their subsidy
expires and replacing them with new subsidized workers.
4.4 Payment vehicle
Wage subsidies are typically paid in one of three ways: through the tax system, through
the social security system, or as direct programmatic payments to the employer or worker.
For example, Turkey forgives both the worker?s and employer?s social security and health
insurance contributions for newly hired recipients. If paid through the tax system, wage
subsidies usually take the form of a refundable credit: workers? taxes are reduced by the
amount of the subsidy, and if these taxes are less than the subsidy, the difference is paid as
a tax refund. If administered through the social security system, the subsidy usually takes
the form of a reduction in the employer?s and/or worker ?s social security contribution.
Other programs set up their own reporting and payment system, and make direct subsidy
payments to the employer or (less often) the worker. Clearly, piggybacking on an existing
system lowers the administrative costs of the subsidy program, but may also lock the
program into some other features of the existing system, such as periodicity of payment
and rules for counting income or earnings.
4.5 Vouchers
Eligibility determination can be handled in either of two ways. First, the employer can
be made responsible for identifying eligible workers as part of the hiring process. In that
model, the employer would then certify and/or document the eligibility of individual
workers and file for the subsidy. Second, an independent agency, probably governmental,
may determine the eligibility and issue vouchers to those deemed eligible, which could be
redeemed by any employer who hires the worker. The voucher would signal to employers
that the worker is eligible for a wage subsidy and relieve the employer of that responsi-
bility. Given that one of employers? chronic complaints about wage subsidies is that they
are administratively burdensome and that some studies have found that employers do
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not claim subsidies for a large proportion of their eligible employees, this could improve
the take-up rate of the subsidy. It would also have the desirable effect of assuring that all
potential employers are aware of the worker?s eligibility for the subsidy.
4.6 Conditionalities
Subsidies can include conditionalities on employers and beneficiaries. In the first case,
the two main goals are to reduce substitution effects and to provide incentives to increase
contracts? length. Substitution effects can be reduced if employers are not allowed to dis-
miss workers for a given period after having hired a subsidized worker. The subsidy can
also be conditioned on extending the length of the employment contract after the subsidy
expires. Several of the OECD programs use this type of conditionalities on employers (see
Banerji and Robalino 2009).
In the case of beneficiaries the goal is to reduce windfall effects, by attracting those
who are really facing difficulties in finding a job and gaining work experience. This can
be achieved, for example, by requiring beneficiaries to participate in job-related training,
either before or after being hired, in order to qualify for the subsidy. The well known
Jovenes programs in Latin America always combine the equivalent of a wage subsidy with
training. More recent programs legislated in Lebanon and Tunisia also attach training to
the wage subsidy.
Receipt of wage subsidies is, of course, conditional on work in the subsidized job; this is
usually seen as one of the main advantages of wage subsidies over income transfers.
4.7 Reporting requirements
To administer the subsidy, the government must collect two types of information: that
required to determine the eligibility of individuals (initial and ongoing) and that required
to determine the amount of the subsidy. Where eligibility relates only to employment
status ? e.g., industry, hours of work, or wage rate ? this information can be provided
relatively easily by the employer. Some eligibility characteristics, such as receipt or dura-
tion of social insurance or unemployment benefits or immigration status, can be obtained
from government records, possibly within the same agency that administers the subsidy.
More detailed individual characteristics like income pose more difficult administrative
problems. If eligibility is based on annual income in the prior calendar year, this infor-
mation can be obtained through the tax system, as is done for wage subsidies in the U.S.,
U.K., and Chile. Subsidies based on annual income are, however, extremely unrespon-
sive to short-term changes in income. If, for example, a worker loses their job in March,
it may be a full year before the the tax return for that year is available to document that
loss. Unfortunately, more frequent income reporting, which can take the form of regular
monthly reports from the employer or periodic (e.g., every 6 months) redetermination of
eligibility, probably involving the worker, can be quite burdensome for employer, worker,
and government alike. Reporting requirements to determine ongoing eligibility and the
amount of the subsidy will also vary with the complexity of the subsidy. In the simplest
case, once eligible, workers retain eligibility as long as they are employed by the same
employer and the subsidy is determined by their wages. In these cases, employer earnings
reports are sufficient to determine ongoing eligibility and the amount of the subsidy.
Subsidies restricted to a particular industry or age group also have minimal ongoing
reporting requirements; the worker continues to be eligible until he leaves the firm or
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ages out of the subsidized group ? an event that can be predicted from the outset. Only
if ongoing eligibility is based on factors that may change over time ? such as income or
wage rate ? will ongoing reporting be required for eligibility purposes.
If the subsidy is based on earnings and eligibility is based on factors that either don?t
change over time or change predictably, like age, the only ongoing reporting requirement
is employer-reported earnings. Employers have an incentive not to underreport earnings,
because that would reduce the subsidy. Moreover, if there is a tax on earnings, they also
have an incentive not to overreport earnings, because that would increase workers? tax
liability and workers would complain. In any case, if there is already some system in place
to verify employers? reporting of earnings for tax purposes, that system may suffice for
purposes of the wage subsidy.
5 Designing wage subsidies in developing countries
As discussed in Section 3, if the goal is mainly to create short-term jobs wage subsidies
are unlikely to be the most efficient instrument. Their impact on employment rates is
small and there can be important substitutions and windfall effects16 Also, in the case
of developing countries, the problem often is not unemployment but underemployment:
individuals, including with higher levels of education, working in low productivity jobs
(see Cho et al. 2012). Wage subsidies, however, could have role as a means to give indi-
viduals work experience in a given occupation and build skills and human capital. In this
case, and if well designed, the dynamics effects of wage subsidies could compensate for
implementation costs. In this section we discuss key policy choices that would need to
be considered along some of the dimensions described above in order to achieve this
objective.
5.1 Eligibility criteria
Perhaps the most fundamental policy choice in adopting a wage subsidy in developing
countries is the definition of the target population. If, as we have argued, the role of the
subsidy is allow individuals to gain work experience and build skills, the more obvious
beneficiaries should be first-time job seekers or those trying to find jobs after long peri-
ods of inactivity or unemployment. In developing countries, youth and women are two
groups which are more likely to be in one of these three states. Depending on the con-
text, governments can also target individuals with certain education levels or in certain
regions. But, by definition, earnings would not be a criteria to target the subsidies. In all
cases, it would be desirable that the subsidy be relatively narrowly targeted, for several
reasons. First, this will limit the cost of the subsidy and/or allow a more generous, and
therefore likely more effective, subsidy. Second, narrower targeting is likely to increase
the employment effect for the targeted class because the demand for a small subset of the
labor force is more elastic than the demand for a broader class of labor. Finally, a narrow
class is less likely to substitute for other workers and also reduce windfall effects.
In all cases, eligibility determination should be managed by the sponsor of the program,
which would need to develop the necessary verification processes (e.g., to determine age,
education level, and employment status). Wage subsidy vouchers can then be given to
eligible individuals. Whatever group(s) is chosen, it is important to make the eligibility
criteria as simple as possible. Complex criteria are likely to give rise to substantial error
in eligibility determination, both through honest mistakes and because they are more
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difficult to verify and therefore more prone to falsification. Even the common criterion of
unemployment is likely to be hard to verify in countries with a large informal sector. In a
new program, the problem of verification is likely to be compounded by a deluge of appli-
cations descending on an inexperienced program staff. Regardless of the criteria, clear
specification of the documentation to be required should be established at the outset.
5.2 Defining the subsidy
The amount and structure of the subsidy will have important implications for its effec-
tiveness as a policy tool and for its cost. An obvious threshold condition is that the subsidy
be large enough to make it profitable for the employer to hire the worker. Operationaliz-
ing this criterion is more difficult. One benchmark against which wage subsidies can be
assessed is the non-wage cost of labor. If the subsidy does not offset a substantial fraction
of the non-wage cost of labor, it may not be worthwhile for the employer to hire subsi-
dized workers. The structure of the subsidy will also influence the employer?s decisions
about whether to hire subsidized labor and, if so, which workers.
A fixed subsidy will tilt the employer?s incentives toward hiring the lowest-wage work-
ers, because it offsets a larger proportion of their earnings. As discussed in Section 2, a
proportional subsidy will be more neutral across wage levels. On balance, we believe that
this is a better policy, especially if the wage subsidy is intended to help new labor market
entrants, like high school and college graduates, who may be higher skilled. Of course, it
is also possible to set different subsidy rates for different classes of workers, as several of
the countries described earlier in this paper have done. But this again can limit the set
of jobs to which individuals can apply. Subsidies can be too small for higher productivity
jobs with more learning potential.
5.3 Duration
A further critical feature of the subsidy is its duration. If the objective of the program is
to give certain types of worker more work experience and on-the-job training in an effort
to build up their skills to the point where they can be employed on an unsubsidized basis,
the duration of the subsidy must be carefully calibrated. As discussed above durations
adopted across countries range between 6 and 24 months. Subsidies below six months are
unlikely to achieve skills learning objectives. After one year, on the other hand, the core
skills demanded by a given job are like to have been acquired.
5.4 Conditionalities
As discussed above, subsidies can include conditionalities on employers and beneficiaries.
In the case of employers, countries could consider imposing restrictions on the dismissal
of workers in order to reduce substitution effects. They can also condition the subsidy
on extending the length of the employment contract after the subsidy expires. Because
of monitoring and enforcement reasons, however, it is unclear that the benefits of these
conditionalities outweigh the costs.
In the case of beneficiaries, on the other hand, it seems important to try to reduce
windfall effects by attracting those who are really facing difficulties in finding a job and
gaining work experience. This can be achieved, for example, by requiring beneficiaries to
participate in job-related training, either before or after being hired.
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5.5 Making payments
Making timely, accurate payments is one of the fundamental responsibilities of the man-
agers of a subsidy program. The simpler the subsidy calculation formula, the easier it is to
achieve this goal. Subsidies that take the form of a reduction in an existing payroll tax or
contribution will occur automatically and are as accurate as the underlying tax or contri-
bution. The same applies to subsidies that are fixed as a proportion of negotiated wages
(up to a maximum).
In both cases, the agency in charge of managing the subsidy can make payments to the
employer based on its reports to the social security (see next sub-section). This implies
that employers do not receive payments ex-ante; they are reimbursed for part of the labor
costs that they have incurred.
5.6 Enforcement and verification
As with any benefit system, wage subsidies must be accompanied by a rigorous monitor-
ing system to prevent and/or detect fraud and abuse. The monitoring systemmust ensure
both that each employee for whom the subsidy is claimed is not only eligible for the sub-
sidy but is actually working, that the claimed wages are being paid, and that the data used
to determine the amount of the subsidy are accurate. The principal tools available for
compliance monitoring include documentation requirements; cross-checks against other
government records; and in-person audits with employers or workers.
The difficulty of the monitoring task will be strongly influenced by the complex-
ity of the subsidy. Perhaps the simplest eligibility requirements to verify are those
that can be checked against existing records (e.g., those based on age, education, or
participation in an existing program). For example, it should be relatively easy to deter-
mine whether a worker is receiving unemployment compensation and, if so, for how
long. It will be much more difficult to establish the employment status of workers not
receiving unemployment compensation, especially in the presence of a large informal
sector.
Documentation of earnings for computation of the subsidy is likely to be straightfor-
ward - if the subsidies only apply to formal wage employment. Nearly all countries, even
in the developing world, have some form of earnings tax or social security contribution
based on earnings. The subsidy claimed must be consistent with the earnings reported in
this system. Thus, verification of earnings for subsidy purposes can rely on the existing
monitoring system. In the simplest case, where the subsidy is simply a reduction in this
tax or contribution, it automatically falls within that system. Of course, this means that
monitoring of wage subsidy compliance is only as good as the monitoring of the exist-
ing system. In designing a wage subsidy, policy makers should look closely at the existing
monitoring safeguards and, if necessary, strengthen them.
The final piece of a compliance monitoring system is in-person audits, conducted both
in response to indications of possible fraud and on a random basis. The objective of these
audits is both to detect fraud and to deter fraud. To serve the latter purpose, they must
be sufficiently frequent, and the penalties for fraud must be sufficiently strict, that they
serve as a deterrent to false subsidy claims. Of course, any safeguards are only as good as
the program staff who apply them. Those staff must be well-trained in the requirements
of the new program and its enforcement procedures. Operations manuals for the new
programmust be provided and knowledgeable supervisors must be available as resources
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for the front-line staff. While a case could be made for decentralized administration
of certain kinds of wage subsidies, central administration, with clear lines of authority
and accountability, is probably generally preferable. Local administration can lead to lax
administration and/or outright fraud.
5.7 Governance and links to other programs
Wage subsidies can be administered in a number of different ways ? by a free-standing
agency; as part of some larger labor-related agency, such as that responsible for labor
regulation; or through the existing tax or social security system. The choice will depend
in large part on institutional factors within the country.
To maximize their impact, wage subsidies might also need to be linked to other
active labor market programs such as training, counseling, intermediation and job search
assistance17. For this reason, a natural entry point to receive wage subsidies are pub-
lic employment services agencies (see Robalino and Sanchez-Puerta 2009). In principle,
these agencies can become ?one-stop shops? where job-seekers register. The agency then
connects job-seekers with different service providers under specific contracting and pay-
ment systems. Some of these service providers can be responsible for linking beneficiaries
of wage subsidies with employers and monitoring the implementation of the program
(see below).
5.8 Monitoring and evaluation
Subsidy administrators and policy makers need to know, in real time, whether the subsidy
is being implemented as intended. At least in theory, a subsidy system should automati-
cally generate a flow of data ? the information used to determine eligibility and that used
to determine the amount of the subsidy. These data can be used to answer important
questions about the program. As we will see, however, they will be much more useful if
augmented by other data collection efforts.
A number of important questions center on the recipient population: What proportion
of the target population is receiving the subsidy? If there are several target populations
(e.g., youth, disabled), does the penetration rate vary across groups? Answering these
questions will require both data on the characteristics of the recipient population and
data on the entire eligible population. The former will usually be provided directly by the
eligibility determination system. The latter will require population data, usually available
from general surveys of the population. But other questions about the composition of the
recipient population probably cannot be answered with eligibility data. For example, it
would be useful to know whether high-wage or low-wage workers are being subsidized,
the education level of the subsidized workers, or whether the subsidized workers are the
primary workers in their family. It may be possible to answer the first of these questions
with earnings data provided by employers for subsidy calculation purposes. Questions
like the second and third, however, will require new data collection from firms or workers.
It would therefore be useful to conduct periodic surveys of workers covered by the sub-
sidy. These surveys need not cover the entire subsidized population, although they must
be carefully designed to be generalizable to that population (e.g., they might be a random
sample of the subsidized population). It would probably be efficient to draw a two-stage
random sample, first sampling firms and then workers within firm, so that firm data could
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be used to locate workers for the interview. At the same time, employer data could be
drawn and merged with the employee data.
Finally, it will be important to know the distribution of subsidy payments across firms.
Several studies have found that participation in employer subsidies is highest among large
firms, and that many small firms are unaware of the subsidy. Subsidy administrators need
to know whether this is true in their case and if it is, to take corrective actions to inform
nonparticipating companies. It will also be important to know the distribution of the sub-
sidy across industries and geographic or political regions, since uneven distribution may
run counter to national development goals. To the extent that data on firm size, location,
and industry are not already available from government records, it is relatively easy to
collect it from firms claiming the subsidy. In sum, for management purposes, a subsidy
program needs not only a system for generating descriptive statistics from data flowing
in from eligibility determinations and subsidy payments, but should also collect ancil-
lary data from sample surveys of workers and firms, to answer questions that go beyond
simple descriptions of subsidies paid and their recipients.
The program monitoring system is intended to provide ongoing feedback to subsidy
administrators about the operation of the system in real time. But because the manage-
ment information system is focused on subsidy recipients, it cannot provide information
on post-program outcomes or measure the impacts and cost-effectiveness of the subsidy.
For these purposes, separate data collection and analysis is needed. By ?impact?, we mean
the difference between subsidy recipients? actual outcomes and what would have hap-
pened in the absence of the subsidy. Many different methods exist to measure impacts.
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to go into the strengths and limitations of the
various evaluation approaches; here, we simply emphasize a few main points:
Programs should be tested on a small scale before being implemented nationally. If done
correctly, such a pilot test will allow not only estimation of the impact of the subsidy on
recipients? employment and earnings, but will also provide a pretest of implementation
procedures.
Once implemented, every program should be subjected to periodic impact evaluations,
to determine whether the program is achieving its objectives.
Rigorous program evaluation will nearly always involve collecting outcome data (e.g.,
employment and earnings) on a control or comparison group of individuals not receiving
the subsidy and on subsidy recipients no longer receiving the subsidy. If such data are not
available from existing administrative systems, special surveys will be needed. Evaluation
methods based on a randomly assigned control group provide the strongest measures
of program impact. Where random assignment is not possible, ?difference-in-difference?
measures or comparative interrupted time series models are often the strongest available
alternative.
5.9 Communication
Workers and firms can only respond to the subsidy if they know about it. This may seem
like a simple matter of sending a letter to each employer, but in practice it is likely to be
much more complex. Such communications may be ignored, may not be understood by
the recipient, or may go to the wrong person altogether. These possibilities are particu-
larly salient in countries in which communications with the business sector are not highly
developed. Even in developed countries, knowledge of tax policy can be surprisingly
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limited. The experience of the U.S. with the New Jobs Tax Credit in the late 1970s is
instructive. In a Department of Labor survey conducted just after the end of the first
tax year in which the credit applied, only 34 percent of the firms interviewed said that
they knew about the new tax credit (which was scheduled to expire at the end of that
year) (Perloff and Wachter 1979). Although nearly 90 percent of firms with more than
500 employees had heard of the tax credit, only 27 percent of small firms (those with 0?9
employees) had heard of it. Similar results were found by Lamberts (1993) in Belgium and
by van Nes et al. (1998) in the Netherlands. Developing countries are likely to be dealing
with firms more like the latter than the former. Moreover, many of the workers one would
like to reach in developing countries are in the informal sector, where the government has
little or no communication with workers.
To overcome these barriers to communication, the government will need to publicize
the wage subsidy through as many and diverse channels as possible. Written communi-
cations to employers and workers should be supplemented with a public media campaign
via newspapers, radio, and flyers placed in locations that are likely to be frequented by
targeted workers. Presentations to business and civic groups on the new benefit are also
likely to be useful in getting the word out.
6 Conclusions
The main goal of this paper has been to discuss the rationale for wage subsidies in
developing countries and suggest possible options in terms of design and implementation.
One of the conclusions is that if the main goal of government is to create short-term
jobs, wage subsidies might not be the most effective instrument. In general the effects of
wage subsidies on employment rates are modest and there can be important substitution
and windfall effects. If the goal is to create jobs rapidly, public works and services where
subsidized jobs are created directly by the government are probably a more effective
alternative. (See Subbarao et al. 2012).
A more promising function of wage subsidies in developing countries would be to allow
workers to acquire skills that improve their employability and labor market opportunities
through work experience and on the job-training. Some of the evidence reviewed in the
paper suggest that, at least in the case of certain groups such as youth, the effect wage
subsidies persist after they expire. In this case, wage subsidies would need to be targeted to
first time job seekers or to workers who have experienced long periods of unemployment
or inactivity.
Countries adopting wage subsidies would then need considered the following issues in
terms of design: 1) in order to minimize substitution and windfall effects, target wage
subsidies to narrow categories of workers who are truly excluded fromwage employment;
2) promote self-selection by asking beneficiaries to participate in preparatory activities
such as life-skills training; 3) use vouchers to identify beneficiaries but make payments to
the employer to increase incentives for take up; 4) set wage subsidies as a percentage of
negotiated wages up to a maximum; 5) have in place the right communication campaign;
and 5) have in place the necessary systems for enforcement, monitoring and evaluation. In
terms of the latter, given considerable uncertainty regarding the impact of wage subsidies
on human capital and labor market outcomes, it is important that programs are piloted
and evaluated prior to full scale implementation.
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Endnotes
1Neumark (2013) and Neumark and Grijalva (2013) discuss the evidence in the United
States of using hiring credits to encourage employers to create new jobs. They find
evidence that hiring credits focused on the disadvantaged were ineffective but that, in
the context of the recovery from the Great Recession, broader credits may be effective.
Some specific types of hiring credits ? including those targeting the unemployed and
those that allow states to recapture credits when job creation goals are not met ? appear
to have succeeded in boosting job growth. But some credits appear to increase hiring
without increasing employment (or at least not in the same proportion), suggesting that
these credits can lead to labor churning.
2There is a large literature on the effects of work experience on productivity and
earnings (see Mincer 1974) which we do not attempt to summarize here.
3For other theoretical models where signaling and recall expectation play a role
see Rodriguez-Planas (2009) and for an empirical application Rodriguez-Planas
(2013).
4Here we assume that wages do not adjust automatically with changes in the level of
productivity. One way to think about it is that they remain constant during the duration
of the contract.
5In practice this is not difficult to do. Employers would know that they would receive a
given percentage of whichever wage they agree to pay ? probably up to a maximum (see
section on design and implementation).
6Layard (1997), and Bell et al. (1999) argue that wage subsidies to the long-term
unemployed may have beneficial general equilibrium effects because working increases
their human capital and also their earnings.
7Regulations on minimum wages can also prevent wage cuts but then the solution
would not be a wage subsidy but a change in the regulation.
8For comprehensive reviews of the literature see Phelps (2004).
9Firms that employ subsidized workers may have a competitive advantage in the
product market because one of their inputs is subsidized. If their business expands at the
expense of businesses with fewer or no subsidized workers, the subsidized workers are
said to displace unsubsidized workers. As with substitution, displacement offsets the
effects of the subsidy on aggregate employment but amplifies the employment effect for
the subsidized class, raising much the same questions for policymakers.
10Since wage subsidies are paid only in the formal economy, they increase the net wage
differential between the formal economy and the informal economy. This will have the
effect of inducing some workers to leave the informal economy to take jobs in the formal
economy. Since the informal economy is quite large in most developing countries, this
could be a sizable effect. If there is a large supply of workers in the informal economy the
supply of low-skill labor will be quite elastic, leading to a situation where employment
gains (in the formal sector) are large, but there is little effect on wage rates and most of
the monetary value of the subsidy is captured by employers. There may be little effect on
aggregate employment, including the informal sector, but the quality and productivity of
jobs may increase.
11The other study, Perloff andWachter (1979), estimated an impact of 3 percent, based
on a relatively simple comparison of employment gains by firms that knew about the
credit and firms that did not. This estimate almost certainly overstates the impact of the
credit because firms with growing employment had a much stronger incentive to learn
about the credit than firms with declining employment, since the credit only applied to
employment in excess of 102 percent of the previous year. Bishop (1981) employed
much stronger controls for selection bias.
12Although the study did not estimate directly the impact of on-the-job training on
employment, it did find that, for all women in JTPA about four-fifths of the impact of
the program on earnings was due to increased employment.
13The Belgian In-Work Tax Credit is also similar to these two subsidies.
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14Heckman and co-authors investigate the impact of wage subsidies on skill
formulation. They analyze two prototypical models of skill formation: (a) a
learning-by-doing model and (b) an on-the-job training model. In general the authors
find different results for the two models bearing different implications of wage subsidies
on skill formation. On-the-job training models predict that wage subsidies reduce skill
formation. Learning-by-doing models predict the opposite. The provisional evidence
favors the learning-by-doing model. Findings show that EITC increased the long term
wages of participants with low levels of education.
15For a discussion see Galasso et al. (2004). The authors show that in Argentina the
government?s response to the crisis of implementing a work requirement as a
precondition for receipt of the Jefes transfers and offering a wage subsidy to employers
produced effects. The wage subsidy appears to have been largely an incidental provision
aimed at recruiting employers to provide jobs for those subject to the work requirement.
By 2008 more than 80 percent of the beneficiaries were working in some type of
employment project. The program apparently drew a large number of workers from the
informal sector because the Jefes transfer was higher than the (sub-minimum) wages
attainable there. A more deliberate implementation of wage subsidies in Argentina
occurred in the late 1990s, when a randomized experiment (Proempleo) was conducted
to measure the effects of wage subsidies and wage subsidies plus training on
employment and earnings.
16If in a given context, for instance an economic slowdown, the goal is to protect
and/or create jobs rapidly, interventions that increase aggregate demand or public works
and services where the government creates jobs directly are probably a better option.
(see Banerji et al. 2014).
17For evidence on the positive impact of these combined programs see Orr et al.
(1996), Katz (1998), and Cockx et al. (1998).
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